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Chapter 4 - The evolution of public-private intelligence 
‘partnerships’ during the Global War on Terrorism 
 
This chapter examines the rationales and implications behind the evolution of public-private 
intelligence interactions during George W. Bush’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 
Although the relationship between the intelligence community and the private sector predates 
the GWOT, a series of factors fostered its growth in the US in the decade following the 9/11 
attacks. Three types of rationales for this growth are discussed. First, following the end of the 
Cold War, the US political context offered a permissive environment in which privatisation 
burgeoned. Second, the evolution of the nature and the imminence of the threats faced by the 
US intelligence community fostered calls for cooperation between the intelligence 
community and the private sector. In the time of crisis that followed 9/11, policy-makers and 
intelligence managers considered that staff shortages within the intelligence community 
needed to be filled rapidly. In order to do so, vast amounts of money were appropriated to the 
intelligence community and intelligence managers were then able to rely on private 
contractors to augment the capabilities of the US intelligence community. As a result, both 
the US intelligence community and the market for intelligence expanded. These two first 
rationales helped the government justifying privatisation by presenting it as a necessity 
resulting from the requirements that were faced by the intelligence community. However, 
these requirements were not only due to ‘new’ threats and demands, but also the product of 
previous governmental decisions. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, following a 
movement of privatisation that decimated its ranks, the intelligence community considered 
that outsourcing intelligence was the easiest solution to palliate an apparent lack of 
capabilities.  Third, some authors have suggested that the US government has occasionally 
turned to the private sector in order to circumvent regular channels of intelligence 
accountability, or even to further some government officials’ private interest.1 
Notwithstanding that it may have occurred in some specific cases, this type of rationale does 
not fully explain the increasing scope and depth of public-private intelligence interactions 
since 2001. From 9/11 onwards, public-private intelligence interactions proliferated and 
diversified to an unprecedented level. Private contractors, that is to say commercial 
companies (industrial contractors) and individuals (independent contractors), now carry out 
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all types of intelligence activities for the government, from the most banal kind of 
administrative support to the most sensitive covert actions. In this context, it is not infrequent 
to hear that public-private relations are maturing towards a ‘partnership’.2 However, a closer 
look at the organisation of public-private interactions reveals a more complex reality. 
Furthermore, a variety of private entities relate to the US government and its intelligence 
community in ways that are not always formal, harmonious or economically viable. 
 
The government’s rationales for an increased reliance on the private sector 
 
A permissive environment 
 
The privatisation movement 
In the second half of the twentieth century, economic and political views supporting 
privatisation gained increasing appeal and reached the realm of national security. The 
foundations for privatisation were actually laid in the 1950s in academia and in politics. The 
so-called ‘Chicago school’ provided an economic rationale for unfettered free markets and a 
series of government decisions set up the policy of contracting-out commercial activities.
3
 
The end of the Cold War prompted the prominence of a capitalist ideology and similar 
economic arguments that consider privatisation as a positive solution to the shortfall of 
government resources, capabilities and performance.
4
 Proponents of privatisation argued that 
shifting the production of goods and services from the government to the private sector 
allows cost-savings in the long term because the existence of public-private competition and 
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comparative advantages within the private sector would drive costs down.
5
 For example, 
when contracting out its activities, the government would not have a lifetime obligation 
regarding the health care and retirement benefits of the people it hires. 
 In the US, these economic arguments were relatively well received by a people whose 
belief in self-government has historically been strong. Popular political leaders such as 
Ronald Reagan introduced privatisation on the national agenda in the 1980s
6
 in a deliberate 
effort to reduce the scope of the government and change the balance between public and 
private sectors.
7
 In his inaugural address, President Reagan famously argued that 
‘government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem’.8 The US Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-76 then became a central tool behind the 
outsourcing of governmental activities. The circular set up a procedure to review the 
operations of government and determine which ones are ‘commercial’ or ‘inherently 
governmental’.9 It also provided a mechanism to measure private versus public sector 
efficiency. President Reagan started to outsource a considerable amount of government 
activities, among which military support services.
10
 For example, in the 1980s, the Army 
started planning its reliance on civilian contractors with the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP).
11
 However, overall, this venture in privatisation remained limited by 
the reluctance of various government agencies attached to their prerogatives.
12
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 The privatisation trend was not limited to just Republican presidents. After a lull 
under President George H. W. Bush, the Clinton administration streamlined privatisation 
across multiple areas. In 1993 Vice-President Al Gore initiated the national performance 
review, which intended to determine how to transform the government bureaucracy in an 
‘entrepreneurial government’ in order to guarantee better public performance levels.13 
Capitalism and privatisation, it was expected, would reinvent the government. Deregulation 
was deemed to guarantee better public performance levels. A series of legislation modernised 
government procurement and partly redefined ‘inherently governmental functions’.14 On the 
White House website, Gore drew a list of achievements resulting from this initiative and 
announced that ‘with 377,000 fewer employees, the federal government is now the smallest it 
has been since President Eisenhower’.15 This policy also affected the defence and intelligence 
communities whose workforces were significantly downsized during the 1990s.
16
 In 1996, 
the Defense Science Board produced a report on ‘outsourcing and privatization’.17 In his 
letter accompanying the report, the chairman of the board recommended to the Secretary of 
Defense ‘an aggressive outsourcing initiative’, to ‘improve the quality of support services at 
significantly reduced costs’.18 According to the former Chief Human Capital Officer at the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the intelligence community was 
‘decimated’ and some agencies lost as much as 40 percent of their capability.19 Meanwhile, 
the defence and intelligence communities started to rely more extensively on contractors’ 
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supplies and services to support their missions.
20
 The First Gulf War (1991) and then the 
American intervention in Bosnia (1995) confirmed the importance but also the difficulty to 
manage private contractors supporting the military.
21
 
 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the intelligence community and the Pentagon, 
in particular, increasingly sought to meet its requirements through technology solutions 
provided by the private sector. Many of these technologies were ‘superior and cheaper than 
those developed by the government’.22 As the private sector improved and diversified its 
offering, for example in the sector of satellite imagery services,
23
 the intelligence community 
increasingly relied on commercial companies to collect information and support its 
missions.
24
 The company ManTech provided support services to Army intelligence during the 
First Gulf War, and then in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania.
25
 In the US, as a result of the 
privatisation movement, the critical information infrastructure shifted gradually towards the 
private sector. A declassified document produced by the NSA in December 2000 worried that 
private sector infrastructure was becoming ‘more vulnerable to foreign intelligence 
operations and to compromise by a host of non-state entities’.26 Manifestly, intelligence 
community leaders recognised that the security and fates of the public and private sectors had 
become increasingly intertwined. Intelligence agencies relying on technological development 
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devised policies to augment their reliance on the private sector. A policy directive approved 
by the director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) on 10 September 1997 
emphasised how the agency could ‘improve performance by capitalising on proven 
commercial capability, capacity, and efficiency’.27 Michael Hayden, the former director of 
the NSA, recognised in a 2002 testimony that the NSA’s ‘strategy for nearly three years has 
been a shift to a greater reliance on American industry’.28 
 The so-called open source revolution in the 1990s generated enthusiasm for the 
development of networks of experts bridging the public-private divide. In an article published 
in 1993, Robert Steele, a specialist on open source intellignece, imagined ‘an extended 
network of citizen analysts, competitive intelligence analysts in the private sector and 
government intelligence analysts, each able to access one another, share unclassified files, 
rapidly establish bulletin boards on topics of mutual interest’.29 Steele further argued that the 
privatisation of intelligence would be particularly relevant to broaden not only producers but 
also the consumer base for intelligence products.
30
 The open source intelligence movement 
was livening up a basic truth of intelligence, society constitutes a pool of knowledge, global 
reach, experience and skills that intelligence agencies cannot overlook.
31
 In this context, it 
seems logical that the US government has come to rely increasingly on the private sector for 
research and development, the collection and analysis of information.
32
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 President George W. Bush strongly endorsed privatisation. As many other senior 
policy-makers in the US, President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld had extensive experience in the private sector.
33
 In 2002, the President’s 
management agenda emphasised market-based performance and the outsourcing of products 
and services that were not ‘inherently governmental’.34 The outsourcing of services was 
particularly prevalent. In 2003, the Office of Management and Budget revised its circular A-
76, which regulates competition for commercial services and among other aims, this revision 
intended to support the administration’s goals towards more competitive sourcing. In 
particular, the revision was supposed to help downsizing the civilian workforce in the 
Department of Defense by 50 percent.
35
 From 2000 to 2010, federal spending on service 
contracts increased from $164 billion to $343 billion.
36
 In this context, the 9/11 attacks and 
the wide support they generated for the Bush administration constituted an opportunity to 
further its belief in privatisation, including in the realm of national security intelligence. 
 
The ‘functional arguments’ for privatisation37 
From the early 1990s onwards, the nature of the threat facing the US called for a 
disaggregation of its security strategy and an increasing reliance on the private sector. With 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, US intelligence agencies were faced with a diversified 
set of new challenges while their workforce was downsized. In 1993, the new Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI), James Woosley, famously underlined this shift when he told 
Congress: ‘we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering 
variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track of’.38 
                                                 
33
 President Bush worked in the oil industry during his early career. Vice-President Cheney was chairman of the 
board and chief executive officer of Halliburton, one of the largest oilfield service corporations in the world. 
Secretary Rumsfeld was CEO of a pharmaceutical company and sat on the board of many other companies. For 
more on Cheney and Halliburton, see Pratap Chatterjee, Halliburton’s Army. How a Well-Connected Texas Oil 
Company Revolutionized the Way America Makes War (New York: Nation Books 2009); Robert Young Pelton, 
Licensed to Kill. Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Three Rivers Press 2007) pp. 100-1. On 
Rumsfeld, see: Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld. An American Disaster (London: Verso 2007) pp. 55-72. 
34
 White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President’s 
Management Agenda, 2002, p.17, <http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/03budget/content/appendix/mgmt.pdf> 
(accessed 12 February 2011). 
35
 Valerie Bailey Grasso, ‘Defense Outsourcing:  The OMB Circular A-76 Policy’, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, 30 June 2005, pp. 16-9. 
36
 David Berteau et al., ‘DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment’, Report of the CSIS Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group, May 2011, p.1. 
37
 Elke Krahmann, States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2010) p.10. 
38
 James R. Woosley, Testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 
Nomination of James R. Woosley to be Director of Central Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 103
rd
 Congress, 1
st
 sess., 2-3 February 1993, p.76. 
141 
 
Less than a decade later, when George W. Bush became President, Woosley’s metaphor held 
true. If anything, US intelligence managers faced more and more snakes. In the words of a 
senior intelligence officer, the intelligence community had to focus on ‘literally the entire 
world, all of the peoples, all of the cultures, all of the languages’.39 Moreover, the end of 
bipolarity paved the way for the emergence of ‘new wars’ (Afghanistan and Iraq) where the 
military is facing adversaries such as insurgents that cross the traditional nation-state 
boundaries and tend to use unconventional methods.
40
 As a result, the intelligence 
community’s support to military operations increasingly focused on individual threats and 
networks. In 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that new technologies and an 
emphasis on networks would revolutionise the sectors of defence and national security.
41
 This 
alliance between technology and networks proved particularly successful in the early days of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
42
 and it also solicited a deeper alliance between the public 
and private sectors. 
 Furthermore, terrorists’ ability to penetrate open societies and their indiscriminate 
targeting of civilians called for greater cooperation between the civilian entities that may be 
targeted in the American homeland such as transportation, communication networks, energy 
circuits, and the government.
43
 Since citizens constitute the quintessential targets of terrorism, 
they were asked to notice any unusual trend or fact to the intelligence community.
44
 The 
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government aimed to create a new ‘information sharing environment’ in which both the 
public and private sectors would share prevention strategies and warning about specific 
attacks.
45
 This emphasis on surveillance in the homeland fostered the emergence of 
commercial companies specialised in gathering, fusing, analysing and disseminating 
intelligence to government agencies.
46
 Some of these companies offered ‘tailor-made security 
solutions’, arguing that they could gather information that is closer to the source of the threat, 
closer to society.
47
 This situation was also reinforced by US law which restricts government 
access to private information and imposes fewer restrictions on the private sector.
48
 As a 
result, the government began to rely increasingly on private-sector databases such as the ones 
created by credit card marketing companies to gather private information.
49
 
 
Emergency growth and structural conditions 
 
The unprecedented growth of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ in the GWOT can be 
traced to the structural conditions under which an overwhelming increase in demand for 
intelligence occurred.
50
 Following the 9/11 attacks, the legitimisation of the role of the 
government in securing the homeland constituted a key dynamic behind the privatisation of 
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intelligence. Since public-private intelligence ties have existed throughout American history, 
the growth of the intelligence community logically instigated further public-private 
intelligence interactions. In other words, the growth of the intelligence budget from 2001 
onwards generated an increase of the intelligence community’s reliance on the private sector 
in absolute terms. The IC reliance on the private sector also increased in relative terms when 
compared to the pool of government employees and in order to justify this relative growth, 
intelligence managers have repeatedly evoked the structural conditions that constrained the 
US intelligence community. From this perspective, the intensification of the outsourcing of 
intelligence in the twenty-first century stems from the government’s lack of strategic 
planning in the area of human capital. After the downsizing of the 1990s, a significant part of 
the national security workforce shifted to the private sector. Following 9/11, the requirements 
for intelligence products and services dramatically increased and managers were expected to 
provide a rapid and effective answer to the crisis.
51
 However the scarcity of resources and 
loss of institutional knowledge within the IC meant that new challenges could hardly be met 
by the community alone. To support the surge in intelligence requirements, senior policy-
makers decided to augment the capabilities of the intelligence community. President Bush 
‘gave orders to increase the size of the analytic and operational cadres in CIA by 50 percent 
each’.52 According to the ODNI, ‘more than 50% of the Intelligence Community workforce 
was hired after 9/11’.53 This reaction was based on the debatable conclusion that the US 
‘intelligence agencies on 9/11 just didn’t have enough people to do the job’.54 With hindsight, 
some commentators have criticised the decision to comfort the US intelligence community’s 
‘bureaucratic instinct that bigger is always better’.55 For Carl Ford, a former senior 
intelligence official at the State Department, ‘pouring more money and human resources into 
taming surprise only insures many of the policy-makers’ urgent problems will go 
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unaddressed’.56 Nevertheless, Congress effectively sanctioned the growth of the intelligence 
community by granting it vast amounts of money.
57
 In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, 
the intelligence community’s budget roughly doubled. In addition, the use of supplemental 
appropriations and overseas contingency operations funding to carry out the GWOT, which 
are renewed on a yearly basis, made it ‘very difficult to hire government employees’ because 
these latter are ‘very difficult to hire one year at a time’.58 In this situation of emergency, the 
intelligence community expanded rapidly and in a relatively unplanned fashion. 
 The loss of experience that occurred in the 1990s effectively created a need to replace 
knowledge and skills. As a result, the government started to rely more heavily on commercial 
companies providing the services of former experienced government employees to augment 
particular intelligence capabilities. An unclassified document released by the ODNI notes that 
the ‘dramatic surge required people with the institutional knowledge and tradecraft to fill skill 
gaps and train new hires. Much of that expertise existed among our retired ranks, who 
answered the post-9/11 call to duty as a de facto “intelligence reserve corps”’.59 Similarly, 
Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA, is keen to note that the intelligence 
community was not experiencing a new growth but it was simply ‘buying back capacity, 
buying back capability, buying back resources and personnel that we had lost in the decade of 
the ‘90s following the collapse of the Soviet Union’.60 In this view, when outsourcing 
intelligence, the government was able to keep talented professionals close to the 
community.
61
 
 The alternative, which was not followed at the time, was to hire new government 
employees. However, recruiting and training new government employees typically takes time 
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and this was a resource policy-makers appeared to lack following the 9/11 attacks.
62
 
According to Michael Chertoff, the Director of the Department of Homeland Security 
between 2005 and 2009, the intelligence community needed the flexibility and the 
responsiveness of the private sector.
63
 Following the 9/11 attacks, contractors were expected 
to fill the intelligence community’s capability gaps temporarily, until the government would 
catch up. The government could not have directly augmented its number of full-time 
employees because it is a very slow bureaucratic process. Government employees need to be 
vetted and trained for years in order to acquire the necessary experience and work 
efficiently.
64
 Outsourcing government activities to former employees with security clearance 
typically proceeds faster, often only a few weeks.
65
 Moreover, once an activity is outsourced, 
a commercial company can get started quickly, direct important sums of money towards the 
product or the activity and then absorb early expenses in the following years. In contrast, 
because of bureaucratic constraints, the government typically spends its money in a more 
linear fashion.
66
 As a result, it is more difficult for intelligence agencies to spend vast 
amounts of money in a short period of time. Outsourcing is also more flexible because it 
binds the government for the length of contracts, generally for a few years. In this sense, 
contractors can provide a solution to some of the problems of resources allocations and 
prioritisation faced by intelligence managers.  
 In terms of resource allocation, intelligence managers are limited by the congressional 
ceiling imposed on each agency’s personnel.67 Although Congress can move these ceilings, it 
has been reluctant to do so. In an interview, Michael Hayden noted that ‘money was always 
easier to get increased than it was to get end strength… because [raising the end strength] has 
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an air of permanence about it, whereas money appropriated for this fiscal year, that’s a good 
idea’.68 Therefore intelligence agencies used supplemental appropriations to hire contractors 
and raise their capability temporarily.
69
 In this way, the workforce grew without being limited 
by congressional ceilings. This explains why (in some cases) the use of contractors may have 
been ‘driven by factors unrelated to mission’.70 Furthermore, the reliance on contractors can 
minimise resource allocation problems by focusing government employees on key tasks and 
orienting contractors towards support tasks. More generally, contractors can act as a 
temporary fix in order to palliate some of the capabilities gaps caused by the uncertain 
variation of intelligence requirements. In turn, the federal government’s intention to use 
contractors as a temporary fix, partly explains why the lack of planning behind the 
community’s increasing reliance on contractors was deemed acceptable.71 Interestingly, this 
managerial perspective presents the privatisation of intelligence in a-political and pragmatic 
terms as an aggregation of ad hoc managerial adjustments aiming at restoring security 
rapidly. This perspective plausibly explains why, when problems involving public-private 
‘partnerships’ occurred, the leaders of the intelligence community did not seem to have kept 
an eye on them.  
 
Privatisation as a strategy for domination 
 
Privatisation has been described as a political strategy aiming ‘to realign institutions and 
decision-making processes so as to privilege the goals of some groups over the competing 
aspirations of other groups’.72 This strategy could support political goals such as the 
expansion of influence,
73
 and many studies point out that, under some specific conditions, 
privatising security allows government reducing political costs, depoliticising decisions or 
even evading accountability all together by shifting responsibilities and removing basic 
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decisions from the public to the private realm.
74
 For example, Joshua Chaffin, a journalist, 
reported that ‘the Pentagon used private contractors to interrogate prisoners in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in a deliberate attempt to obscure aggressive practices from congressional or 
military oversight’.75 Considering some of the controversies that surrounded the use of 
intelligence agencies by policy-makers, such as the Watergate scandal or the use of raw 
intelligence by the Bush administration to support its case for a war in Iraq, this type of 
argument is conceivable. However, while executive aspirations provide a plausible intent, a 
more careful examination of the events following the 9/11 attacks weakens the argument that 
privatising intelligence reduces political costs. First, as the policy failure in the lead-up to the 
2003 Iraq War demonstrated, decision-makers do not need to rely on the private sector to 
circumvent traditional intelligence processes or gain more power. Experienced policy-makers 
can use the bureaucracy to their own ends. For example, when Rumsfeld created an Office of 
Special Plans, he effectively created an extra layer of bureaucracy that sidestepped the 
traditional intelligence processes.
76
 Second, in the case government officials would outsource 
an activity to hide some wrongdoing, the fact that they could outsource actually brings more 
people in the loop, not just the public actors but also some private actors. Inevitably the more 
people know about a secret, the more likely it is that it will be revealed. Considering the 
attention security and intelligence contractors have drawn, at least since 2004, the continuing 
government reliance on contractors despite the political headache such arrangements have 
sometimes caused, suggests that the government had more significant other reasons to rely on 
the private sector.
77
 Nevertheless, certain experts have argued that outsourced activities are 
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often less transparent than political and bureaucratic structures.
78
 Dana Priest, an 
investigative journalist for The Washington Post, holds that outsourcing masks ‘the fact that 
the government was growing in response to the 9/11 attacks’.79 Although Priest is not wrong, 
in the realm of national security intelligence agencies have never been controlled by 
completely overt bureaucratic and political structures, and even since the institutionalisation 
of congressional oversight in the 1970s the intelligence committees mostly meet in secret. 
Fourth, if privatisation really turns out to weaken intelligence accountability, it does not mean 
that decision makers intended to do so. For instance, there has been some confusion - not to 
say conflation - between the use of the private sector as a cover to protect intelligence 
agencies’ sources and methods and its use to cover agencies’ wrongdoings.80 While the 
former situation is part of the daily challenges of intelligence, such abuses do surface 
occasionally and are often difficult to prove. 
 Privatisation is sometimes considered as a strategy adopted by policy makers and 
intelligence officials to further their own interest and the interest of their former colleagues 
who moved to the private sector.
81
 This strategy can be opportunist in an electoralist and 
nepotistic sense if the decision-maker intends to reward political allies. Allegations of 
cronyism have been widespread in recent years and are supported by at least two phenomena: 
the revolving door or the flow of individuals moving from the public to the private sector 
(and vice versa) and the American system of political funding. The first phenomenon feeds 
allegations that some government employees developed strong ties with some commercial 
companies and awarded them government contracts in order to obtain a job with one of these 
companies when they left the government.
82
 Although this sequence of events may actually 
not breach the law, the revolving door does give an incentive for senior policy-makers to 
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make favours to commercial companies for which they have worked or those that are willing 
to hire them in the future.  
 The second phenomenon that feeds allegations of personal interest is the funding of 
political campaigns by some of the companies that are involved with the intelligence 
community.
83
 It is reasonable to suppose that these companies expect political favours in 
exchange to their funding and, in at least two cases, this kind of cronyism has been proved 
illegal. In 2006, former Republican congressman Randy Cunningham (R-CA) was convicted 
for using his position as a member of the House appropriations and intelligence committees 
to earmark contracts for MZM Inc. with the Pentagon’s Counterintelligence Field Activity 
(CIFA).
84
 Cunningham was sentenced to eight years in prison.
85
 In 2007 Kyle “Dusty” 
Foggo, then executive director at the CIA, was convicted for using his position to steer public 
money towards one of his friends’ defence company.86 Both cases suggested that mechanisms 
controlling the regularity of contracts and ethics within the Department of Defense and the 
CIA were imperfect. However, overall, they do not provide a satisfying rationale for the 
substantial intensification of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ in the twenty-first 
century. These two cases, whilst attracting considerable attention, remain relatively isolated. 
 An overview of the weight of some of these rationales was provided by the ODNI in 
2008 during a conference held by the agency’s Chief Human Capital Officer, Ronald 
Sanders.
87
 The pie chart below is a declassified slide of the PowerPoint document on which 
Sanders based his intervention. The percentages presented in the pie chart confirm the unique 
character of some of the services provided by the private sector, with 56 percent of core 
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contract personnel providing ‘unique expertise’ to the intelligence community in 2007.88 This 
percentage corroborates arguments that the private sector is essential to the IC. The chart 
(below) also confirms that some of the decisions to privatise are based on: cost-effectiveness; 
the uncertain nature of intelligence activities; and surge requirements related to the GWOT. 
 
Figure 1 – NIP Contract Personnel FTEs: Percentage by Purpose (FY 2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Letter to the Author, FY 2007 Results, US 
Intelligence Community, Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel, p.5.
89
 
 
In his presentation, Sanders explained the meaning of some of the categories used in this 
chart. Funding uncertainties consists for example in year-to-year emergency supplemental 
funding. Surge requirements occur when the government hires contract personnel to fill the 
gap, while civilians are being trained and developed to be eventually deployed instead of 
contract personnel. According to Sanders, the percentage for surge requirement was higher in 
the years directly following the 9/11 attacks. Non-recurring projects are defined as work with 
very specific and definite duration. Further explanation about other categories was later 
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provided by the Intelligence Community Directive Number 612 which became effective on 
30 October 2009. Among others, the directive describes transfer of knowledge as maintaining 
‘critical continuity or skills in support of a particular mission or functional area in the face of 
skills gaps, the loss (anticipated or otherwise) of mission-essential USG civilian or military 
personnel, or other similar exigency’.90 Overall, the information presented by the ODNI is 
revealing but incomplete. The ODNI figures are based on a part of the aggregate intelligence 
budget for 2007, the budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and not its totality. 
They only account for core contract personnel and leave out other types of contractors. The 
category ‘Other’ on the pie chart remains unexplained. 
 There is strong evidence that the US intelligence community’s reliance on the private 
sector has so far been truly essential to US national security. Intelligence, because of its 
nature, could not function without the private sector. This explains why the relationship 
between the IC and the private sector is here to stay.
91
 The fiercest opponents of the 
intelligence community’s reliance on the private sector, those who argue that intelligence (as 
a whole) should not be privatised,
92
 do not properly take into account the fact that 
government bureaucracy is unable to provide all the innovation, flexibility and critical 
knowledge necessary for the craft of intelligence.
93
 Public-private coordination is essential to 
intelligence because the government needs the expertise of the private sector to carry out its 
mission and for intelligence agencies not to rely on the private sector, government would 
have to grow so significantly that the United States may transform into a burdensome and 
undemocratic security state. 
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Proliferation and diversification 
 
The government’s consumption of private intelligence 
 
The strengthening of the rationales for privatising intelligence in the GWOT generated a 
quantitative proliferation and qualitative diversification of the relationship between the IC 
and the private sector. In May 2007 Terry Everett, a senior procurement executive at the 
ODNI, revealed that 70 percent of the intelligence budget was spent on private contracts
94
 
and based on the budget for the NIP in 2006, it appears that $28.63 billion were spent on 
private contracts that year.
95
 Another slide used by Everett during the ODNI presentation 
suggests that the spending on intelligence contractors roughly doubled from 1996 to 2006.
96
 
However such aggregate budget figures typically conflate the provision of supplies and 
services. In this context, expensive goods such as satellites are likely to constitute the lion’s 
share of the 70 percent spent on private contracts. Considering human capital, the ODNI 
revealed in 2008 that 27 percent of the intelligence community’s workforce, that is to say 
37,000 contractors, was engaged in ‘core’ intelligence tasks.97 Among these, several 
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thousands were individual contractors who, by definition, do not depend on a company.
98
 
According to a national security expert, in 2007, in the most sensitive division of the CIA, the 
National Clandestine Service, ‘over half of the workforce is made up of industrial 
contractors’.99 At the NSA, procurement spending doubled from 2000 to 2004 and was 
forecast to double again in the following decade.
100
 According to an account of a briefing by 
Harry Gatanas, the Senior Acquisition Executive for the NSA from 2004 to 2005, in 2003 
alone, the NSA executed some 43,000 contracts, and in 2004 the Agency used as much as 
2,690 businesses.
101
 In a Senate hearing, James Clapper noted that when he served as director 
of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), from 2001 to 2006, ‘half of the labor 
force was contractors’.102 In 2007, the Director of the DIA stated that contractors represented 
about 35 percent of his agency’s workforce.103 In sum, these figures confirm that contractors 
constituted a significant part of the intelligence community’s workforce between 2001 and 
2009. 
 Since 2007, further disclosures clarified the proportions of the 70 percent of the 
intelligence budget that were spent on private contracts.
104
 The document on which Ronald 
Sanders based his presentation reveals that collection and operations take most of the budget, 
and that management and support, and analysis and production are also significantly 
outsourced. According to the release, a significant part of the budget for the NIP (22 percent) 
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is spent on technology. In a follow-up interview, Sanders further specified that there were no 
particular reasons for this overall repartition.
105
 The outsourcing of intelligence activities 
expanded in a relatively unplanned fashion and this is not surprising. As Wilbur Jones 
observed in his seminal history of US acquisition, the overall precept followed by the US 
government has been ‘to act now, worry later’.106 
 
Figure 2 – NIP Contract Personnel FTEs: By Function and Agency (FY 2007) 
 
 
Source: ODNI, Letter to the Author, Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel, p.4.
107
 
 
Although this chart gives an idea of contractors’ contribution to intelligence activities, it 
remains limited by a broad and debatable view of what intelligence agencies do. Contractors’ 
provision of goods and services to the intelligence community can be divided in six sub-sets 
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of activities: collection, covert action, analysis, dissemination, management and support, and 
counter-intelligence.
108
 When carrying out these tasks, contractors have worked from places 
ranging from offices in Washington DC area to the frontlines in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 Since the beginning of the GWOT private contractors have been involved in all the 
types of intelligence collection from the most mundane tasks to the most sensitive. 
Companies have contributed to the collection of signal (SIGINT), imagery (IMINT) and 
measurement intelligence (MASINT) when they developed and built satellites or drones.
109
 
Drones have been remotely controlled by private contractors sitting in an office somewhere 
in the US or abroad, providing timely imagery intelligence and 24-hour surveillance of 
sensitive areas on the frontlines of the GWOT. Contractors worked in the National Counter 
Terrorism Center to collect and maintain intelligence to feed its terrorist database.
110
 They 
also worked closer to the field. For example, the intelligence community contracted out 
linguists and social scientists to join teams collecting human intelligence (HUMINT) in 
Afghan and Iraqi villages.
111
 The US Army Intelligence and Security Command used 
contractors to conduct ‘overt and controlled HUMINT operations in support of deployed U.S. 
and coalition forces’ in Iraq and Afghanistan.112 Contracted linguists also worked directly in 
the interrogation room,
113
 and contractors devised sets of techniques to interrogate detainees 
and some interrogated detainees.
114
 In the course of a congressional hearing in 2008, Michael 
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Hayden suggested some contractors may have been involved in waterboarding
115
 and 
recognised that the CIA used contractors to conduct espionage, although ‘by and large, these 
were individual contractors’.116 In the CIA Iraq station, contractors reportedly worked as case 
officers, recruited informants and supervised government agents supporting combat units.
117
 
In Afghanistan, contractors reportedly gathered ‘intelligence on the whereabouts of suspected 
militants and the location of insurgent camps’.118 Finally, commercial companies collected 
and provided open source intelligence (OSINT) to the intelligence community.
119
 Some of 
these companies specialised in the aggregations of data on other companies’ customers.120 
This type of arrangement reportedly allowed the government to circumvent the Stored 
Communications Act which prohibits companies, such as Internet Service Providers, from 
turning over some information directly to the government.
121
 
 Contractors have also been involved in some of the most offensive intelligence 
activities led by the IC. According to Robert Young Pelton’s account of his field research in 
Afghanistan, some contractors worked on a ‘CIA-paid covert hunt for Bin Laden in the 
border region of Afghanistan’.122 This use of contractors for paramilitary operations, a type of 
covert action, was indirectly confirmed by the CIA in a press release in which it stated that 
two contractors ‘died while tracking terrorists near Shkin, Afghanistan, on October 25, 
2003’.123 Commercial companies have also been an essential part of the drone war – in which 
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remotely controlled unmanned aerial vehicles have allowed the CIA to conduct targeted 
killings. Private contractors developed, built, maintained, loaded and operated drones.
124
 
Reportedly, ‘management and training responsibility for CIA’s “targeted killing” efforts’ was 
handed to Blackwater USA.
125
 Within the military intelligence community, contractors have 
been in charge of ‘selecting targets for assassination in Iraq and Afghanistan’.126 However, 
according to Dana Priest and William Arkin: 
 
They had to hand the joystick controls over to a federal employee – either a CIA 
officer or someone in uniform – once the vehicle got inside the kill box, meaning 
within the range of launching its missiles. Government and military lawyers 
insisted that a service member or agency officer sworn first and foremost to act in 
the United States’ interest, and not some corporate interest, push the launch 
button.
127
  
 
 Commercial companies have been extensively involved in intelligence analysis. They 
provided data harvesting and mining services to the IC in order to make sense of large 
databases.
128
 Furthermore, companies developed software programmes ‘used to manipulate 
and visualize data’.129 Besides these relatively uncontroversial services, contracted analysts 
briefed senior intelligence officials or policy-makers, a significantly sensitive task given the 
influence experts can have in government.
130
 Hillhouse claimed in 2007 that the President 
Daily Brief, arguably the most important intelligence product, heavily relied on private 
contractors,
131
 but this claim seems to be based on reasoned guesses rather than evidence. 
Commercial companies have also disseminated intelligence. In a 2004 testimony, General 
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Miller, the former commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, pointed out that contractors 
were ‘developing processed intelligence form raw intelligence and feeding our computer 
systems’.132 Raytheon Corporation designed and built the Distributed Common Ground 
System, which allowed the US military to fuse ‘tactical intelligence from military units with 
signals intelligence and imagery from the national collection agencies’.133 Commercial 
companies have also provided the US government with report officers ‘who act as liaisons 
between officers in the field and analysts back at headquarters’.134 
 Contractors have provided all sorts of management and support tasks. In most cases, 
these tasks do not constitute an intelligence activity per se. However, they are essential to the 
functioning of intelligence. For example, a company called Antheon has reportedly trained 
instructors at the Army’s intelligence school in Fort Huachuca, Arizona.135 Commercial 
companies and non-profit organisations advised intelligence agencies on the efficiency of 
their structure and workforce management.
136
 They have also been involved in outside 
reviews and auditing of intelligence community programmes or activities.
137
 At the CIA, 
companies acted as travel agents and planned international trips for the Agency’s employees. 
Some companies were involved in the planning of the extraordinary rendition flights, 
transporting high values detainees around the world.
138
 Companies have also been involved 
in procurement processes. According to Tim Shorrock, Northrop Grumman subcontractors 
managed ‘DIA’s system for processing bids and awarding contracts’139 and various sources 
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have also confirmed the involvement of commercial companies in drafting government 
agencies budgets and writing statements of work.
140
 
 Finally, companies have provided services in the area of counter-intelligence and 
information security, protecting intelligence sources and methods against enemy intrusions. 
Contractors compartmentalised secret information and made sure compartments were 
respected by intelligence producers and consumers.
141
 In order to hide some programmes, 
companies such as Abraxas Corporation have reportedly devised nonofficial covers for case 
officers overseas.
142
 Other companies have physically protected and stored secret documents, 
or provided security tools to protect classified computer networks.
143
 The defunct Blackwater 
company has been reported to physically protect personnel in and around some the most 
dangerous CIA stations and during field officers missions.
144
 Commercial companies also 
provided investigative support and vetted intelligence agencies employees and contractors.
145
 
Finally, private contractors have reportedly acted as counterintelligence officers, overseeing 
clandestine meetings between agency officers and their recruited spies.
146
 
 
The organisation(s) of public-private intelligence interactions 
 
A variety of statuses and incentives 
In the twenty-first century, public-private intelligence interactions have been characterised by 
a variety of statuses and incentives. Regarding the status of the actors, the public side of the 
relation can be defined as one of the 16 government agencies constituting the intelligence 
community. The status of the private entity acting in support of the intelligence community 
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varies and the intelligence community usually contracts out to companies and individuals. At 
the most general level, the Department of the Army defines contractors as ‘persons or 
businesses, to include authorized subcontractors, who provide products or services for 
monetary compensation. A contractor furnishes supplies, services, or performs work at a 
certain price or rate based on the terms of a contract’.147 One key distinction is between 
personal and nonpersonal services contracts. In the former type of contracts, the government 
retains control of and ‘full personal responsibility for the function’, and ‘contractor personnel 
are subject to the relatively continuous supervision and control of a Government officer or 
employee’.148 In the latter type of contracts, the government delegates a function to a 
contractor and ‘the personnel rendering the services are not subject, either by the contract's 
terms or by the manner of its administration, to the supervision and control’.149 Furthermore, 
in its ‘IC contractor workforce assessment’, the ODNI has divided contractors into three 
groups.
150
 Commercial contractors provide commercially available services such as food or 
janitorial services. Another group of contractors, commodity contractors, provide a ‘specified 
commodity, such as a satellite or information system’. Finally, core contractors:  
 
provide direct support to IC mission areas such as collection activities and 
operations (both technical and human intelligence), intelligence analysis and 
production, basic and applied technology research and development, acquisition 
and program management, and management support to these functions. Core 
contractors perform staff-like work, often fully integrated with federal workers 
and working in federal workspaces. Furthermore, they produce work products 
such as reports, analyses, and intelligence estimates that are often 
indistinguishable from those produced by federal personnel.
151
 
 
 Commercial companies working for the intelligence community vary immensely in 
size along a continuum that stems from the well-established defence industry giants to small 
start-up companies relying on their rolodex to provide contractors to an intelligence agency. 
The biggest companies, such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, or Booz Allen Hamilton, 
employ ten thousands of cleared personnel to provide all sorts of services to the defence and 
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intelligence communities. They are so extensively involved with the government that they 
have arguably become semi-public organisations.
152
 Legally speaking, most of these 
companies are actually public companies since they offer their securities for sale to the 
public.
153
 As technology became more complex, these prime contractors, or ‘systems 
integrators’,154 began to rely more heavily on smaller, more specialised, private companies to 
which they subcontract their work. At this second level, the government rely on a contractual 
relation between two or more contractors to obtain intelligence supplies or services. In the 
last decade, companies which were not historically related to the intelligence community 
shifted into the intelligence business. For instance, Google and AT&T, which are known for 
their achievement in information technology, greatly profited from greater public demand for 
intelligence.
155
 Finally, a range of smaller companies focuses more exclusively on 
intelligence activities.
156
 Shorrock estimates that their collective value exploded in the years 
following the 9/11 attacks from $980.5 million in 2001 to $8.3 billion in 2006.
157
 
 The public-private distinction can also be used to distinguish between different public 
and private incentives. In theory, the intelligence community’s main organisational incentive 
is national security. This public end is embedded in the secretive intelligence bureaucracy.
158
 
In practice, however, agencies often pursue their own organisational interest.
159
 Moreover, 
their activities can be influenced at the political level by trade-offs between national security 
and liberal democratic values. Private entities supporting the intelligence community are 
usually considered as ‘partners’, which emphasises a commonality of goals. A former senior 
CIA officer even recalls ‘a very brotherly relationship’ with the company Blackwater, which 
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he felt was ‘an extension of the Agency’.160 Nevertheless, in most cases, the private partner is 
a company with a clear profit interest that is contracted for a particular task. In the market for 
intelligence, as in most other markets, public, private, small, or large companies, have in 
common an incentive structure that primarily aims to fulfil their owners’ main interest: profit. 
At the individual level, profit is rarely the sole incentive and ‘exchanging an official blue 
badge for the contractor’s green one does not automatically divest someone of a sense of 
professional dedication’.161 In this sense, private actors are also driven by their national 
security mission.
162
 Patriotism and self-reward are certainly key motivations but in some 
situations economic interests prevail more clearly. This is the case of informers who accept to 
work for an intelligence agency in exchange of monetary compensations.
163
 
 Commercial companies sometimes relate to the intelligence community for other 
motives and through other means than a contract. Sometimes a company is forced to 
cooperate. For example, this is the case when the FBI serves a subpoena to a company to 
obtain some of its proprietary information.
164
 If a company fails to comply with this kind of 
legal requirement, the government can fine it.
165
 In other cases, a company may be willing to 
disclose information to the government in a more informal way, without requiring a subpoena 
or a warrant. For example, as a part of the Terrorism Surveillance Program, the NSA obtained 
vast amounts of information from AT&T without a warrant.
166
 In this particular programme, 
some companies even took a proactive approach, trying to extend the network of 
communications available to intelligence agencies.
167
 Other companies acted in a more 
adversarial fashion and refused to collaborate with the government because it did not have a 
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warrant.
168
 However, refusals to cooperate are probably rare and Jon Michaels notes that, 
when confronted by the government, ‘firms do not always have sufficiently strong incentives 
to ask a whole lot of questions or necessarily conduct their own legal research’.169  
 In some cases, the correlation between public-private status and public-private interest 
blurs. In 1999, the CIA established a non-profit venture capital firm called In-Q-Tel in order 
to invest in high-tech companies developing products and services of interest.
170
 George 
Tenet, the former Director of the CIA, explained ‘the CIA identifies pressing problems, and 
In-Q-Tel provides the technology to address them’.171 The CIA’s close relation to the firm 
ensured that public and private interests converge, and in practice, although In-Q-Tel is 
private by status, it is publicly led. Apart from companies, other public, private or semi-
private organisations provide services to the intelligence community. The Defense Advanced 
Projects Research Agency, for example, awarded contracts to public and private universities 
to conduct research on surveillance projects.
172
 The RAND corporation defines itself as a non-
profit organisation that intends to ‘help improve policy and decisionmaking through research 
and analysis’.173 Government agencies, as well as foundations and private companies 
commission RAND’s research, which makes it a sort of ‘non-profit’ contractor.  
 Moreover, a handful of trade associations - such as the Intelligence and National 
Security Alliance (INSA) and Business Executive for National Security (BENS) - aim to 
support relations between the intelligence community and the private sector in order to 
‘provide solutions’ to the government.174 These associations are ‘not-for profit’, and mostly 
funded by their member companies and, to a lesser extent, by individual donations. They 
organise networking events and produce reports for senior policy-makers on topics of 
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interest.
175
 In practice, they offer a platform for public and private sector elites to cooperate. 
Indeed, most of the staffs of these associations are former senior government employees with 
relevant experience in intelligence and national security. In the case of INSA, a government 
official serving at the DIA sits on the board of directors and an official serving at the NGA on 
its board of advisors.
176
 The presence of serving senior officials on these boards blurs the 
private nature of INSA. 
 Senior intelligence officials and their private sector counterparts often conceive of the 
relationship between the IC and the private sector as a ‘partnership’.177 Such rhetoric 
reinforces the idea that the intelligence community also encompasses the private entities 
augmenting US intelligence capabilities. Considering the intensification of public-private 
interactions in recent years, the term ‘partnership’ is not incorrect. In 1996, the IC21 Report 
called for ‘a government-commercial bridge’ in order to attempt ‘influencing commercial 
capabilities to encompass government requirements.’178 For instance, INSA co-organised the 
ODNI industry days.
179
 In May 2004, at its annual memorial ceremony, the CIA honoured 
two civilian contractors working for its Directorate of Operations who were killed in an 
ambush in Afghanistan.
180
 The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established an Open 
Source Center within the CIA in 2005, thereby recognising and establishing even more the 
importance of the private sector in acquiring information.
181
 The ODNI launched the ‘Private 
Sector Engagement Initiative’ in 2006 in order to dialogue with the ‘corporate 
community’,182 and a private sector office was established to reach out to the private sector, 
exchange information and institutionalise public-private ‘partnerships’. Public-private 
cooperation was further institutionalised with the creation of a deputy DNI for Acquisition in 
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2007. These efforts were supposed to help sharing the responsibility for national security 
across the public-private divide and build a common understanding of the partners’ 
mission.
183
  
 However, the rhetoric of partnership does not convince everybody. Karen Lund 
Petersen argues it is problematic because it gives commercial companies ‘the power to 
interpret what is best for society and then act on its behalf’.184 Considering the profit incentive 
of companies, this ‘power’ may not always support the public end. The public sector is often 
defined by its capacity for disinterested judgment and decision-making.
185
 A characteristic 
that is not necessarily present in the private sector. An ODNI report noted that acquisition has 
suffered from ‘instances of noncompliance, cost and schedule overruns and poor process 
discipline’, and that oversight efforts have been ‘impeded by a perceived lack of trust, 
communication, and accountability in the IC acquisition community’.186 Some commercial 
companies actually hesitate or even refuse to cooperate with the government for fear it may 
impact on their reputation or for fear they may engage in illegal activities.
187
 Vice versa, 
government agencies sometimes distrust companies working for them and refuse to share 
sensitive information.
188
 Even in the case of non-profit organisations such as BENS and 
INSA, the idea of a partnership can be contested since the existence of these associations is 
mostly guaranteed by commercial companies’ funding, and is therefore captive to their private 
interests. Moreover, a sense of rivalry is emphasised by the existence of public-private 
competition. As the ODNI noted in its 2006 human capital plan, ‘we find ourselves in a war 
for talent, often for the most arcane and esoteric of skills, sometimes between ourselves 
and/or with our own contractors’.189 In turn, the variation of incentives explains why public-
private intelligence interactions should not always be considered as ‘partnerships’ but rather 
as a set of interactions, a more neutral characterisation. Eventually, the profit incentive of the 
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private sector is not problematic as long as the government stays in charge and ensures the 
market logic contributes to a more cost-effective as well as democratic national security. 
 
An imperfect market for intelligence  
The free market logic, which was behind the origins of the privatisation movement, hardly 
applies to the specificities of the US market for public, or governmental,
190
 intelligence. On 
the demand side, this market is characterised by a main buyer of services and goods, the US 
government.
191
 It is the government, and not the company’s managers, which typically 
determines the type of product or service and the quantity that is needed.
192
 Arguably, the 
government is constituted of various agencies with different types of requirements 
constituting various buyers. However, in the case of the intelligence community, most of 
these agencies are now following a common set of policies and regulations developed by the 
ODNI and, more generally, by the US government.
193
 As a whole, the government is 
therefore both buyer and regulator. On the supply side, the situation is oligopolistic. In other 
words, a few prime contractors dominate the market. This situation is not new and in 1978 a 
CIA report on competition in contracting already noted that given the unique nature and 
requirements of the supplies or services being procured ‘the number of firms in America 
capable of handling major systems contracts in the very specialized areas of technology of 
concern to National Programs is few’.194 Since then, the biggest contractors have diversified 
their offer and specialised on a customer - the US government - rather than on a type of 
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product or service. Overall, this situation has generated particularly strong market 
imperfections and a lack of competition.
195
 
 When outsourcing intelligence, the government faces number of hidden costs. 
Government employees need to administer the contracting process, that is to say identify and 
assess suitable contractors, and then negotiate and write the contracts. Management costs, 
such as monitoring the agreement, sanctioning the vendor and negotiating changes to the 
contract when necessary are also involved.
196
 The government often faces difficulties to 
determine accurate costs and anticipate performance because of the unpredictable nature of 
intelligence activities such as surveillance or personnel security abroad.
197
 Similarly, the 
history of defence procurement provides countless examples of requirements changes after 
the initial bid, a situation called spiral development.
198
 That is why the government often 
relies on specific types of contracts, such as cost-reimbursement contracts. These contracts 
‘provide greater flexibility’ to the companies but force ‘the government to assume financial 
risk as the vendor has less incentive to perform its work on or under budget’.199 In other 
words, the competition between contractors is based on promises of performance rather than 
performance itself.
200
 Finally, transaction costs arise, for example, when vendors’ fail to 
deliver a good or service. The need to ensure contract compliance, since contracting out does 
not eliminate public responsibility, is another type of transaction cost. In turn, all of these 
costs question the economic rationale for privatising national security. 
 The market for intelligence has developed under the veil of secrecy that pervades the 
US national security apparatus. Commercial companies, wary about their proprietary secrecy 
which is supposed to protect their competitiveness, have embraced this veil. However 
governmental secrecy acts as a structural limit on the market. Following the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), full and open competition, including the advertisement of 
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contracting actions, can be avoided for national security reasons.
201
 An official from the 
Government Accountability Office specialised on defence and national security points out 
that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) makes frequent use of such exceptions.
202
 
Likewise, section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 authorises the Agency to 
conduct ‘negotiated procurement without advertising’.203 Ginger Ann Wright, a CIA lawyer, 
explains that ‘the Agency’s duty to protect intelligence sources and methods overrides the 
FAR requirement for agencies to publish proposed contract actions and awards’.204 In order 
to preserve secrecy, contract officers within the intelligence community often use no-bid, or 
sole-source, contracts according to which only one company can satisfy the government’s 
demand. When so doing, the government supports the absence of competition in order to 
maintain secrecy. Secrecy can also lead to unnecessary competition. For example, Hayden 
points out that the CIA was ‘bidding up the cost’ of contracts, ‘because different pockets of 
the agency were trying to buy the same services.’205  
 More generally, the compartmentalisation of data creates information asymmetries 
between private competitors. Security clearances, which are granted by the government, 
constitute a significant barrier to entry for would-be competitors. In order to access the 
(secret) knowledge and capabilities necessary to obtain contracts, companies hire former 
government employees with security clearance. This commodification of security clearances 
has had negative consequences on the market for intelligence. According to Joshua Foust, ‘if 
two candidates are competing for a job with a contractor, and one has deep relevant 
experience but no clearance, she will most likely lose to a candidate with less relevant 
experience but a current and active security clearance’.206 In such situations, government 
requirements truncate the market logic. In turn, well-established companies with large 
number of cleared employees obtain more contracts than newcomers. Their continuing 
reliance on the government’s demand allows them to further their knowledge of the difficult 
and evolving set of procurement regulations that apply to the intelligence community. This 
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situation partly explains why smaller companies have associated with them in order to work 
for the intelligence community. 
 In sum, the market for intelligence is not an independent and free market and is 
unlikely to become so considering the nature of its goods and services, the environment in 
which they are traded and, in particular, the central role of the government. Government 
reports have also pointed to problems of efficiency in the domain of intelligence outsourcing. 
According to a report of the Senate intelligence committee, ‘the average annual cost of a 
United States Government civilian employee is $126,500, while the average annual cost of a 
“fully loaded” (including overhead) core contractor is $250,000’.207 Furthermore, the House 
intelligence committee has pointed out that many of the major acquisition programs at the 
NRO, the NSA, and the NGA ‘have cost taxpayers billions of dollars in cost overruns and 
schedule delays’.208 In such an imperfect market, privatisation manifestly did not generate the 
levels of performance some of its proponents envisaged. 
 
Public-private mobility  
In the two last decades, public-private mobility has notably increased. Since the early 1990s 
an increasing number of government employees have quit intelligence agencies to work for 
private companies carrying out similar tasks.
209
 According to Julie Tate from the Washington 
Post, ‘at least 91 of the [Central Intelligence] agency's upper-level managers have left for the 
private sector in the past 10 years’.210 Since the US government is the biggest buyer of 
intelligence services and goods, in many cases, former government employees work for 
private companies on governmental contracts. The ODNI itself has pointed out that: 
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increasingly, the IC finds itself in competition with its contractors for our own 
employees. Confronted by arbitrary staffing ceilings and uncertain funding, 
components are left with no choice but to use contractors for work that may be 
borderline “inherently governmental” – only to find that to do that work, those 
same contractors recruit our own employees, already cleared and trained at the 
government expense, and then “lease” them back to us at considerably greater 
expense.
211
 
 
This phenomenon raises questions about the intelligence community’s employment retention 
policy. It begs the question of whether individuals trained at taxpayers’ expenses should be 
allowed to use the knowledge they gained in government to further private interests. Arthur 
Hulnick uses the example of commercial airline pilots who learned to fly in the military to 
point out that ‘the precedent was long ago established that skills acquired in government 
service belong to the individual and not the government’.212 In order to prevent its officers 
from decamping for the private sector, the CIA has allowed its officers to ‘moonlight’ in the 
private sector.
213
 This long-established practice gives a chance to CIA employees to offer 
their expertise to private companies on the side of their work for the government. In sum, 
government employees can work for or move to the private sector, and private sector 
employees can work for or move to the public sector. 
 At the senior level, the career path of many officials in the intelligence community is 
marked by this mobility. The career of Mike McConnell, a former vice admiral in the US 
Navy, epitomises the revolving door phenomenon. McConnell was successively head of 
intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Gulf War of 1991, Director of the 
NSA from 1992 to 1996, Senior Vice President at Booz Allen Hamilton, Chairman of INSA 
from 2005 to 2007, Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2009, and now (2013) 
Executive Vice President and leader of the Intelligence Business at Booz Allen Hamilton. In 
addition, the senior managers of some private companies working for the intelligence 
community have also served as advisers for the executive branch. A Vice President at AT&T 
served on George W. Bush President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.214 Inderjeet 
Parmar notes that public and private leaders are often ‘intimately connected through their 
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social and educational backgrounds, as well as their numerous shared or interlocking 
corporate directorships’.215 
 The growth of public-private interactions and the circulation of personnel across the 
public-private divide appear to weaken the distinction between public and private interests. 
McConnell himself raised this issue in an op-ed for the New York Times in which he 
recognised that during his time at Booz Allen, in many respects he ‘never left’ the 
government.
216
 On the margin, the rapprochement between public and private interests and 
organisations creates an environment that foster conflicts of interests
217
 and can lead to 
unethical practices and abuses of power. In such an environment, the logic of private interest 
supported by individuals, companies and trade associations can take precedence over the 
public interest in national security. For Michael Scheuer, a former CIA officer, the revolving 
door phenomenon ‘prevents senior officials to remain truthful during their service’.218 From 
this perspective, privatisation risks conflating profit with national security at the loss of 
effective national security. The key issue behind the reconfiguration of the public-private 
distinction is therefore to determine the role of the government and public officials in the 
twenty-first century as carefully as possible. 
  
Conclusion 
 
From 2001 onwards, public-private intelligence interactions did not fundamentally change,
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but significantly intensified in a relatively short period of time. For a variety of reasons, the 
US intelligence community increased its reliance on the private sector in the decade 
following the 9/11 attacks. With hindsight, the economic rationale and the set of negative 
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rationales behind the privatisation of intelligence are not so convincing. Moreover, the 
rationales behind privatisation have sometimes been contradictory. For example, the need to 
ramp-up following the 9/11 attacks has conflicted with the longer-term logic of improving 
government effectiveness. Overall the proliferation and deepening of public-private 
intelligence interactions was necessary given the conditions that prevailed at the time in the 
US. However, in a situation of emergency, the privatisation of intelligence was too hastily 
endorsed by the US government.  
The evolution of public-private ‘partnerships’ in the market for intelligence is 
problematic, not the least because this market is deeply imperfect. In turn, the unbridled 
expansion of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ raises legitimate concerns about the 
fading relevance of the public-private distinction and its potential impact on the nature of the 
government. Ultimately, when privatising intelligence, the government keeps bearing some 
significant responsibilities. When intelligence activities are outsourced, the government still 
decides whether or not to produce the good or service and then consumes it.
220
 Although the 
reliance on the private sector presents certain advantages, the outsourcing of intelligence is 
not a silver bullet. The prominent influence of the US government on its private ‘partners’ 
sometimes encourages the private sector to emulate well-known intelligence pitfalls. In this 
context, the continuing importance given to secrecy by the American security apparatus 
threatens the market for intelligence ‘to fade into irrelevance’.221 Similarly, the threat of 
foreign intrusion
222
 or the unpredictable nature of intelligence requirements, processes and 
operations is a challenge for both public and private intelligence providers. In turn, the 
privatisation of intelligence reconfigures state boundaries but it does not necessarily lead to a 
transfer of competence and authorities. In this particular sector where performance is barely 
quantifiable and competition is hardly free, privatisation is a perilous choice that must be 
carefully implemented. 
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